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Problem in International Criminal Court Prosecutions
In May 2010, the states parties of the International Criminal Court (ICC)
will convene in Kampala, Uganda, for the first review conference of the Rome
Statute. This conference comes at a vital time in the ICC's development, and
there is much to reflect on. In the last two years the court has begun its first
trial, issued its first warrant against a sitting head of state, and weathered
scandals stemming from the alleged misbehavior of its prosecutor. Yet
arguably the most significant action the ICC has taken in those years involved
Uganda itself. Between 2006 and 20o8, the ICC played a key role in peace
negotiations in Juba, Sudan, between the Lord's Resistance Army (LRA), a
guerilla movement based in northern Uganda, and the Ugandan government.
The biggest sticking point in those negotiations was the fact that the ICC had
issued warrants against the LRA leaders, including its top leader Joseph Kony.
The ICC's inability to suspend those warrants undermined the Ugandan
government's negotiating position and may have contributed to the failure of
the peace process and Kony's refusal to stop fighting. The states parties should
take the opportunity presented by this conference to reflect on a major question
1. See Julie Flint & Alex de Waal, Case Closed: A Prosecutor Without Borders, WORLD AFF.,
Spring 20o9, at 23 (criticizing Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, for, among
other things, his decision to indict the President of Sudan, his supposedly erratic leadership
style, and allegations that he sexually coerced a journalist); Joshua Rozenberg, Why
the World's Most Powerful Prosecutor Should Resign: Part 1, TELEGRAPH (London), Sept. 14,
20o8, available at http://telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/lawreports/joshuarozenberg/
2236288/why-the-worlds-most-powerful-prosecutor-should-resign.part-i.htm (calling for
Moreno-Ocampo to resign for failing to disclose evidence in the ICC's first trial, which led
to that trial's temporary suspension). But see Christine Chung, Letter to the Editor, A
Prosecutor Without Borders, WORLD AFF., Summer 2009, at 104, 104 (defending Moreno-
Ocampo's tenure and criticizing De Waal and Flint for failing to disclose the identities and
biases of their sources).
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raised by the Juba saga: whether the ICC should be able to suspend
prosecutions for the benefit of peace negotiations.2
This Comment will analyze the role that the ICC played in the Uganda case
and draw on that case to argue that the Rome Statute should be amended to
provide a greater opportunity for peace negotiations to succeed in situations
where the ICC has indicted one party to those negotiations. The argument
proceeds in three parts. Part I describes the provisions of the Rome Statute that
remove discretion to suspend indictments and then illustrates how that lack of
discretion can harm peace negotiations through a short diplomatic history of
the Juba peace talks. Part II shows how the Uganda case is one example of the
unique ex ante/ex post problems that arise in ICC prosecutions of active
participants in the midst of armed conflict. While eliminating the discretion to
suspend an indictment increases the ex ante deterrent value of the ICC to
potential war criminals, doing so may also render it more difficult to end a
conflict once an indictment has been issued by the court. Since the general
deterrent value of the ICC is likely to be small, and its disruptive effect on
peace negotiations large, the ICC ought to maintain robust prosecutorial
discretion so that it can suspend indictments if credible peace negotiations
begin. Finally, Part III argues that the states parties should amend the Rome
Statute to increase the Pre-Trial Chamber's discretion to suspend indictments.
Specifically, it argues that they should amend Articles 17 and 19 (which govern
the admissibility of cases when countries' domestic courts have jurisdiction) to
allow states to supplant ICC prosecutions with proceedings that fall short of
criminal trials, such as truth and reconciliation commissions, in cases where
doing so is vital to an ongoing peace process.
I. THE NO-DISCRETION RULE AND THE JUBA PEACE NEGOTIATIONS
The Rome Statute gives the ICC prosecutor very little discretion to
suspend or even prevent a case at any stage.' The prosecutor is obligated to
2. The ICC is authorized to try criminals for a limited number of crimes related to conflict,
including genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and the crime of aggression.
Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 5, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
[hereinafter Rome Statute]. Prosecution by the ICC involves being brought to and detained
in The Hague, tried, and (if convicted) sentenced to up to life in prison.
3. This is by design - the drafters of the Rome Statute believed that too much discretion would
leave the prosecutor vulnerable to accusations of partiality or political bias. That goal is
expressed in the legislative history of the ICC. For example, in discussing the need for
uniform rules to determine when a country can deny ICC jurisdiction because of
complementary prosecution, one of the drafters noted that without such rules, "the
Prosecutor will be left with uncertainty and unbridled discretion. The outcome may be an ad
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pursue any case referred to him by the United Nations (UN) or any state party4
unless he finds it unreasonable for one of the reasons laid out in Article 53 (for
example, that there is insufficient evidence, that effective complementary
proceedings have been initiated, or that it is against the interests of justice).' If
the prosecutor objects for an Article 53 reason, that objection can be reviewed
by the Pre-Trial Chamber,6 either proprio motu (by its own motion) or by
request of the referring party, and can also be withdrawn at any point by the
prosecutor. 7 Once the prosecution goes forward and the Pre-Trial Chamber
approves an indictment, the prosecutor loses all discretion to halt a case. At
that point, a prosecution can only be stopped if (1) the UN Security Council
passes a Chapter VII resolution to postpone it for a period of twelve months,8
or (2) the Pre-Trial Chamber determines that the case is inadmissible under
Article 17 because a state is genuinely prosecuting the crimes.
This inability of the ICC prosecutor or the Pre-Trial Chamber to suspend a
case after the indictment stage undermined the peace negotiations in Juba
between the LRA and the Ugandan Patriotic Defense Force (UPDF). When the
talks began in 20o6, the two sides had been fighting for two decades and had
collectively killed an estimated loo,ooo people, 9 abducted over 30,000
hoc practice likely to produce discrepancies in dealing with different situations. This would
diminish the perception of impartiality and fairness of the Prosecutor's office in dealing with
different cases and different countries." 1 M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 133 (2005).
4. The prosecutor can also initiate a case on his own, but this has never happened, probably in
part because the approval process is lengthy and burdensome. See BRUCE BROOmHAL,
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: BETWEEN
SOVEREIGNTY AND THE RULE OF LAW 87-88 (2003); HECTOR OLASOLO, THE TRIGGERING
PROCEDURE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 89-90 (2005).
5. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 53(2).
6. The Pre-Trial Chamber is a panel of three ICC judges that authorizes investigations,
confirms or denies the prosecutor's indictments, issues warrants, and handles other
motions.
7. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 53(3)-(4).
8. Under Article 16, the maximum length of any one postponement is twelve months. The
postponements, however, can be renewed indefinitely. In practice, it would be difficult to
convince all of the permanent members of the Security Council to vote to protect a war
criminal from prosecution. See, e.g., John B. Bellinger, III, Legal Advisor to the Sec'y of
State, Remarks at the Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, U.S.
Perspective on International Criminal Justice (Nov. 14, 2oo8), available at
http://2001-2009.state.gov/s//rls/ii1859.htm (noting the Bush Administration's opposition
to efforts to secure an Article 16 deferral for Sudanese President Omar AI-Bashir).
9. Steve Bloomfield, Uganda and Rebels Set for Truce After ioo,ooo Deaths, INDEPENDENT
(London), Aug. 29, 2006, available at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/uganda/news/
article.cfm?l-id=io8&objectid= 10398599.
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people,"° and committed widespread rape, sexual enslavement, execution,
mutilation, and other crimes against civilians." President Yoweri Museveni
referred the LRA to the ICC in 2003 and the ICC indicted five LRA leaders -
including Kony-and, in 2005, issued public warrants for their arrest. 2 Shortly
after the talks began, Museveni offered full amnesty to the top LRA officials
and requested that the ICC withdraw its indictments. 3 An ICC spokesman
rejected this request, stating that "[t]he position of the court is that these
warrants of arrest remain in force," and demanding that the arrest warrants
against Kony and his lieutenants be executed as soon as possible. 4
In June 2007, the government and the LRA agreed that the LRA leaders
would face trials in Ugandan courts as part of the final settlement. These trials
would involve an alternative penalty regime with relatively light sentences that
would "reflect the gravity of the crimes or violations; promote reconciliation
between individuals and within communities; promote the rehabilitation of
offenders; take into account an individual's admissions or other cooperation
with proceedings; and, require perpetrators to make reparations to victims." 's
This arrangement was calculated to rule out ICC prosecution by making the
case inadmissible under the complementary prosecution provision of Article 17,
which provides that the ICC cannot bring a case if a state is willing and able to
prosecute. As a government spokesman put it, "We know the ICC's main
problem is the issue of impunity; we hope that once all agenda items are signed
we will be able to go to them and present an argument that our agreement
lo. See TIM ALLEN, TRIAL JUSTICE: THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT AND THE LORD'S
RESISTANCE ARMY 62 (2006).
11. HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, ICC: INVESTIGATE ALL SIDES IN UGANDA 1 (2004).
12. Evidence suggests that the decision to issue warrants increased the LRA's subsequent
willingness to negotiate with the UPDF for various reasons. See Payam Akhavan, The Lord's
Resistance Army Case: Uganda's Submission of the First State Referral to the International
Criminal Court, 99 Am. J. INT'L L. 403, 416 (2005); Kasaija Phillip Apuuli, The ICC Arrest
Warrants for the Lord's Resistance Army Leaders and Peace Prospects for Northern Uganda, 4 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 179 (2006); Nick Grono & Adam O'Brien, Justice in Conflict? The ICC and
Peace Processes, in COURTING CONFLICT? JUSTICE, PEACE AND THE ICC IN AFRICA 13, 15-16
(Nicholas Waddell & Phil Clark eds., 2008).
13. Michael Wilkerson & Frank Nyakairu, Museveni Offers Kony Amnesty, MONITOR (Uganda),
July 4, 2006, available at http://allafrica.cof/stories/2oo6o7o4oll5.html.
14. Frank Nyakairu, Uganda: Museveni Amnesty to Kony Illegal-ICC, DAILY MONITOR (Uganda),
July 6, 2006, available at http://www.afrika.no/Detailed/1i2493.html.
is. Agreement on Accountability and Reconciliation, Uganda-Lord's Resistance





ensures that the commission of crimes in the conflict does not go
unpunished. " 6
The conflict between the ICC and the negotiating parties subsequently
came to a head. On February 29, 2008, the Pre-Trial Chamber sent Museveni a
letter asking how the agreement between the LRA and UPDF would affect the
ICC warrants against Kony and his lieutenants. Then on March 5, Prosecutor
Luis Moreno-Ocampo was reported to have reiterated that the ICC warrant
must be executed. 7 On March 11, Museveni announced that Kony would not
go to the ICC and would instead be subject only to a "traditional judiciary
process."is The negotiations ended when Kony failed to show up to sign the
final agreement on April 9 after demanding clarification of the judicial
arrangement, particularly which punishments he could face.1 9 He subsequently
returned to fighting and is currently at large in the Congo.2°
It is impossible to know whether the Juba talks could have succeeded had
the ICC gone along with Museveni's plan. One general of the UPDF claims, for
example, that the LRA was only stalling with the talks and was simultaneously
committing violence against civilians and rebuilding its forces through
abductions." Yet the LRA negotiators claimed as late as March 12 that "[i]f
Museveni can put this in writing, black and white... that the warrants are not
a problem anymore and that he asked the ICC to withdraw the warrants, Kony
will sign the agreement."2 Such a guarantee was, of course, never forthcoming.
Museveni was thus forced to play an impossible double game-placating the
ICC with assurances of trials and Kony with assurances of amnesty. Regardless
of whether the negotiations could have succeeded, the role that the ICC played
16. Uganda: LRA Talks Reach Agreement on Accountability, REUTERS, June 30, 2007,
http ://www.alertnet.org/thenews/newsdesk/IRIN/
a8b6o 9 fddi 9 c3827obdcdfoba 4 3fel 3a.htm.
17. ICC Rejects Uganda Rebel Overture, BBC NEWS, Mar. 5, 2008,
http ://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hVafrica/7277577.stm.
18. Tendai Maphosa, Museveni Says Uganda Rebels Will Not Face International Criminal Court,
GLOBALSECURITY.ORG, Mar. 11, 2008, available at http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/
library/news/20o8/o3/mil-o8o311-voao7.htm.
ig. Milton Olupot, Uganda: Rebel Chief Refises To Sign Peace Deal, NEW VISION (Uganda), Apr.
10, 2008, available at http://alafrica.con-/stories/2oo8o4lloool.html.
20. See Jack Kimball, Ugandan Troops Begin Congo Pull-Out, REUTERS, Mar. 16, 2009,
http://reuters.com/aricle/idUSLG275929.
21. Frank Mugabi, Uganda: Army Ready To Attack LRA Rebels, NEW VISION (Uganda), June 15,
2008, available at htrp://allafrica.com/stories/2oo8o6l6oooi.html.
22. Alfred Wasike & Raymond Baguma, Uganda: Museveni Remarks Excite LRA Rebels, NEW
VISION (Uganda), Mar. 12, 2008, available at http://allafrica.comvstories/
20o80 3130020.html.
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in the saga is deeply troubling. The ICC maintained that any effort to reach
peace with the LRA violated Uganda's obligations under the Rome Statute and
that the only solution for Museveni was to continue fighting until Kony was
either killed or sent to The Hague.
Im. THE EX ANTE/EX POST PROBLEM: WEIGHING DETERRENCE
AGAINST CONFLICT
The failure of the Juba peace negotiations raises a major question of
institutional design about the Rome Statute: to what extent do we want actors
in the ICC to be able to suspend cases to help bring about peace agreements?
This is a classic ex ante/ex post problem. 3 If the ICC lacks discretion to
suspend a case, then, ex ante, it will more effectively deter aspiring war
criminals who will understand that they cannot negotiate away the threat of
being imprisoned in The Hague. Ex post, however, a rule of no discretion
forces the ICC to prosecute war criminals even in cases where doing so causes
more harm, such as when a defendant credibly promises to stop fighting in
exchange for amnesty. The question of which rule the ICC should choose thus
turns on three empirical questions about how criminals respond to ICC
indictments: (1) How strong a deterrent is the threat of ICC prosecutions to
people considering becoming war criminals? (2) How much of that deterrent
value is lost by allowing war criminals to negotiate for amnesty? (3) How badly
does the fear of a future prison sentence in The Hague disrupt peace
negotiations?' If, as this Comment argues, the ICC is a weak deterrent, little is
lost by letting criminals negotiate for amnesty, and if the fear of a future prison
sentence disrupts peace negotiations, the case is strong for increasing
prosecutorial discretion.
23. See generally WARD FARNSWORTH, THE LEGAL ANALYST: A TOOLKIT FOR THINKING ABOUT
THE LAW 3 (2007) (describing the tension between using the law to set ex ante incentives
and using the law to do justice to the parties ex post). The ICC is arguably the first
international court to face these issues. The Nuremberg and Tokyo Tribunals, as well as the
various ad hoc tribunals of the 199os, were entirely ex post affairs -they were constituted
after fighting ended to mete out justice to the losers. As a permanent body, the ICC must
consider how actors will respond to its signals before a conflict ends.
24. Deontologists might add a fourth question: is there a moral imperative to attempt to bring
war criminals to justice regardless of the positive or negative consequences? This Comment
assumes without argument that such deontological imperatives are trumped by
consequentialist imperatives when considering what actions the ICC should take.
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The youth and singularity of the ICC, and the attendant scarcity of data on
its direct effects, render these inquiries largely speculative.2" This is especially
so because the deterrent value of the ICC will be heavily dependent on it
achieving successful, high-profile convictions, which it has not yet done. It is
worth noting however that some scholars have used quantitative methods to
attempt to shed light on the deterrent value of the ICC. Michael Gilligan has
constructed a game theoretic model to show that even without enforcement,
the ICC may marginally deter atrocities by reducing the credibility of offers of
asylum. 6 Julian Ku and Jide Nzelibe, meanwhile, have used data on the fates
of failed coup plotters in Africa to demonstrate that the risks inherent in
committing atrocities are already so high (death, etc.) that fear of international
prosecution would be a marginal consideration.27
Additional arguments against the ICC's deterrent value stem from simple
qualitative analysis: the ICC has thus far issued public warrants for only
thirteen people, has captured five of those, and has not yet convicted any. 8 It
depends on states parties to execute its warrants, and it cannot impose the
25. See James F. Alexander, The International Criminal Court and the Prevention of Atrocities:
Predicting the Court's Impact, 54 VIL. L. REv. 1 (2009) (surveying the empirical literature and
noting the impossibility of empirically measuring the ICC's deterrent impact).
26. Michael J. Gilligan, Is Enforcement Necessary for Effectiveness? A Model of the International
Criminal Regime, 6o INT'L ORG. 935, 942-46 (2006).
27. Julian Ku & Jide Nzelibe, Do International Criminal Tribunals Deter or Exacerbate
Humanitarian Atrocities?, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 777 (2006). While their argument rests on the
debatable assumption that failed coup plotters are a good proxy for ICC targets, the central
insight is convincing: a life sentence in The Hague is probably low on the list of terrible
outcomes for warlords like Kony.
28. See International Criminal Court-All Cases, http://www.icc-cpi.int/Menus/ICC/
Situations+and+Cases/Cases (last visited Nov. 28, 2009). Of the five captured suspects, one
appeared voluntarily (Bahr Idriss Abu Garda), Prosecutor v. Garda, Case No. ICC-o2/
05-o2/o9, Case Information Sheet (Feb. 8, 2010), one was arrested while on vacation in
Europe (Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo), Prosecutor v. Gombo, Case No. ICC-oi/o 5-oi/o8,
Case Information Sheet (Mar. 12, 2oo), two had already been arrested and held by
Congolese authorities when their indictments were issued (Thomas Lubanga Dyilo and
Germain Katanga), Prosecutor v. Katanga & Chui, Case No. ICC-o1/04-o1/0 7, Case
Information Sheet (Nov. 25, 2009); Prosecutor v. Lubanga, Case No. ICC-oi/o4 -os/o6,
Case Information Sheet (Sept. 16, 2009), and one was arrested after having given up
fighting as part of a peace agreement (Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui), IBA Human Rights
Institute, Case of the Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Mathieu Ngudjolo Chui,
http://www.ibanet.org/HumanRightsInstitute/ICCOutreachMonitoring/
ICCDRCKat Chui.aspx (last visited Mar. 22, 2010). A rational warlord might look at
these cases and conclude that the safest course of action is not going on vacation, not
accepting peace agreements, and not being captured, rather than not committing war
crimes.
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death penalty.29 Even if the ICC had already achieved several high-profile
convictions, it seems unlikely that guerrilla warlords who operate in rural
Africa, such as Kony, would have heard of the ICC before being indicted by it.
Finally, even in the context of normal crimes prosecuted by domestic criminal
justice systems that present a more credible threat of capture, there is strong
evidence that prison sentences fail to deter."0 Prosecution by the ICC thus
seems like a fairly remote concern for somebody considering committing war
crimes, especially when weighed against the immediate motives for those war
crimes.3 On the other hand, amnesty agreements and truth and reconciliation
commissions that immunize war criminals from prosecution have helped end
many violent conflicts throughout the world, and especially in Africa. 2 It
therefore seems unwise to trade the possibility of peace through amnesty for
the benefits of such a speculative deterrent.
Ill.PEACE THROUGH COMPLEMENTARITY
Given the weak evidence for ex ante deterrence and the strong case for
allowing ex post peace deals, the Rome Statute should be amended to give the
prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber wider discretion to suspend a case. In
the past few years, a number of scholars have raised this very issue in the
context of the failure of the Juba negotiations. Some of these have focused on
the power of the prosecutor to prevent a case from going forward under Article
5333 if it is "not in the interests of justice," arguing that this should be read to
include cases that would undermine peace agreements. 34 Unfortunately, this
solution happens at the wrong stage-in Uganda, the ICC prosecution had
already been initiated and the warrants issued when peace negotiations began.
29. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 59 (describing arrest proceedings in custodial states); id. art.
77 (describing penalties, which are limited to prison terms, fines, and forfeitures of
property).
30. See, e.g., David S. Lee & Justin McCrary, Crime, Punishment, and Myopia (Nat'l Bureau of
Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 11491, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=76277o (showing that the likelihood of a person committing a crime
does not decrease when he or she turns eighteen, despite the fact that the likelihood of
incarceration increases).
31. See ALLEN, supra note io, at 64-65 (describing the strategic advantages of the LRA's practice
of abducting children as soldiers and forcing them to murder their families).
32. See Jack Snyder & Leslie Vinjamuri, Trials and Errors: Principle and Pragmatism in Strategies
of International Justice, INT'L SEC., Winter 2004, at 1, 5.
33. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 53.
34. See Eric Blumenson, The Challenge of a Global Standard of Justice: Peace, Pluralism, and
Punishment at the International Criminal Court, 44 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 8ol, 832 (2oo6).
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Others have argued that the Pre-Trial Chamber should interpret Article 17's
complementarity exception to apply to nonjudicial proceedings, such as truth
and reconciliation commissions." This would allow states parties like Uganda
to offer effective amnesty to their enemies while getting the ICC off their backs
in a legal, procedurally clear way. Unfortunately, this solution runs up against
the text of the statute. The complementary proceeding exception of Article 17
does not apply if the Pre-Trial Chamber determines a state is "unwilling or
unable genuinely to prosecute. '' 6 That determination is made according to
three factors enumerated in Article 17: whether the proceedings are intended to
shield the suspect from prosecution, whether there has been an unjustified
delay in the proceedings, and whether they are being conducted independently
and impartially.37 Under this rubric, Museveni's plan in the Juba negotiations
would almost certainly fail, as its purpose was quite explicitly to shield Kony
from the ICC.3s Indeed, the ICC Pre-Trial Chamber held as much in an
opinion issued nearly a year after the peace negotiations broke down, noting
"the paramount criterion for determining the admissibility of a case is the
existence of a genuine investigation and prosecution at the national level."'3 9
Instead, the states parties should amend Article 19 so that, in the context of
peace negotiations, states with relevant jurisdiction can initiate complementary
proceedings that are legislatively guaranteed to give light or suspended
35. See, e.g., William W. Burke-White & Scott Kaplan, Shaping the Contours of Domestic Justice:
The International Criminal Court and an Admissibility Challenge in the Uganda Situation, 7 J.
INT'L CRIM. JUST. 257 (2009); Carsten Stahn, Complementarity, Amnesties and Alternative
Forms of Justice: Some Interpretative Guidelines for the International Criminal Court, 3 J. INT'L
CRIM. JUST. 695 (2005). Other scholars have argued for solutions that involve general
prosecutorial discretion or the substitution of nonretributive justice mechanisms. See, e.g.,
Alexander K.A. Greenawalt, Justice Without Politics? Prosecutorial Discretion and the
International Criminal Court, 39 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 583 (2007); Louise Parrott, The
Role of the International Criminal Court in Uganda: Ensuring that the Pursuit ofJustice Does Not
Come at the Price of Peace, i AUSTL. J. PEACE STUD. 8 (2006). Still other authors have argued
that the ICC should recognize amnesty agreements only in particular circumstances. See,
e.g., Charles P. Trumbull TV, Giving Amnesties a Second Chance, 25 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 283,
320-26 (2007) (advocating a multifactor balancing test to determine when amnesties are
acceptable).
36. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 17.
37. Id.
38. See Burke-White & Kaplan, supra note 35, at 271 (stating that the Ugandan government
"must reform the Amnesty Act so as, at the very least, to exclude ICC indictees from
amnesty").
39. Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-ol/05, Decision on the Admissibility of the Case
Under Article 19(1) of the Statute, 36 (Mar. 10, 2009).
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sentences, or that come with the promise of an administrative pardon. In doing
so they should add something like the following subsection:
12. If a State which has jurisdiction challenges a case's admissibility
under paragraph 2(b), the Pre-Trial Chamber or Trial Chamber shall
ignore questions of sentence severity and promises of administrative
pardons for purposes of determining jurisdiction under 17(2)(a) and
20(3)(a), if it determines that a. the suspect in question is willing to
submit themselves to the State's jurisdiction but not that of the ICC,
and b. efforts to bring the suspect into ICC jurisdiction would risk
violence and jeopardize peace.
This solution imposes legal process while still letting a state give the criminals
what they most want- the ability to avoid a long jail term- and thus a bigger
incentive to stop fighting. Under Article 17, the complementary proceeding
must still be independent, impartial, institutionally competent, not unduly
delayed, and intended to bring the suspect to justice. If it fails to meet these
criteria, the prosecutor can file a motion to restore the ICC's jurisdiction.
Further, there will be no problem of multiple failed attempts: under Article 19,
a state party can move to take jurisdiction from the ICC only once.
It might be argued that the requirement of a complementary proceeding in
this proposed solution, even one without any serious punishment, is too
risky -better to allow conditionless amnesty deals than force a formal trial-like
process on the parties. One clear downside of conditionless amnesties is that
they allow suspects to evade prosecution through bad faith negotiations and
then return to fighting. The solution proposed here provides an additional
benefit over conditionless amnesty: it may actually improve the negotiating
position of states seeking peace by giving them a limited but statutorily
credible window to grant amnesty, which the suspects must take or risk
prosecution. If a suspect is worried about being captured, the conditions
attached to suspension of an ICC prosecution could allow a state to press for
better terms (for example, public apologies or even prison sentences) with the
argument that the peace agreement must be sufficiently credible to placate the
ICC's Pre-Trial Chamber.4"
40. It is conceivable, for example, that war criminals could see being moved to The Hague as a
worse punishment than imprisonment in their home country. To take one example, the
terrorist and drug lord Pablo Escobar repeatedly attempted to negotiate to be sent to jail in
Colombia (first building his own prison in Medellin, then offering to go to a normal prison
in Bogoti) in exchange for not being extradited to face trial in the United States. See MARK
BOWDEN, KILLING PABLO: THE HUNT FORTHE WoRLD's GREATEST OuTLAw (2001).
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It might also be argued that, given the bleak view of the ICC's deterrent
value articulated in Part II, this solution is inferior to forcing the ICC to
operate in secret until its suspects are captured or to simply abolishing the ICC
altogether. Admittedly, amending Article 19 in the way proposed here may fail
to secure peace in situations where the suspect is unwilling to submit to a
national proceeding even with the guarantee of a light or suspended sentence
or where a suspect does not trust the national tribunal to proceed effectively
and thus believes the tribunal's jurisdiction will be stripped by the ICC. While
these more extreme solutions might therefore encourage amnesty-based peace
deals more effectively than the solution proposed here, they would eliminate a
major benefit of the ICC: it politically isolates its targets. Many observers
believe that the ICC warrants motivated the LRA leadership to negotiate for
peace in the first place. 41  Similarly, international warrants politically
undermined dictators Slobodan Milosevic and Charles Taylor, 42 and the threat
of embarrassment from an ICC investigation may have helped prompt the
recent split between warlord Laurent Nkunda and the government of
Rwanda.43 By keeping the ICC's warrants public, the referring parties can
continue to use the ICC to undermine war criminals and even to drive them to
the negotiating table. Indeed, with the reform proposed here, the ICC may well
become a tool not only for holding war criminals accountable, but also for
bringing conflicts to an end.
CONCLUSION
The 2010 ICC review conference provides an opportunity to reflect on the
moral consequences of levying the machinery of international law against
warlords who retain the power to fight. The Preamble to the Rome Statute
affirms that "the most serious crimes of concern to the international
community as a whole must not go unpunished." Yet retribution cannot be the
only goal of international criminal law. In the Uganda case, and more recently
41. Specifically, the warrants caused the LRA's Sudanese allies to withdraw their support,
which motivated Kony to negotiate for peace. See Grono & O'Brien, supra note 12, at 15-16.
Note that while such political isolation causes major problems for war criminals, it does not
undermine the arguments provided in Part II against the ICC's ex ante deterrent value.
Before the ICC takes interest in a suspect, the threat of such isolation is just as speculative as
the threat of imprisonment in The Hague.
42. See PluSCL LA HAYNER, NEGOTIATING PEACE IN LIBERIA: PRESERVING THE POSSIBILITY FOR
JUSTICE (2007).
43. See David Lewis, SCENARIOS: Nkunda Arrest Boosts Risky Congo Peace Plan, REUTERS, Jan.
23, 2009, http://www.reuters.com/article/homepageCrisis/idUSLN479797._CH_.24oo.
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in the Sudan case, the ICC has issued arrest warrants for men in charge of
armies. If the ICC is to continue this practice, it should provide a robust
process by which its cases can be suspended in the interests of peace, such as
the one proposed in this Comment. In fighting humanity's monsters, we must
not lose the chance to tame them.
ERIC S. FISH
